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1Abstract
The paper analyses the timing of spontaneous environmental innovation
when second-mover advantages, arising from the expectation of declining in-
vestment costs, increase the option value of waiting created by investment
irreversibility and uncertainty about private payoﬀs. We then focus on the
design of public subsidies aimed at bridging the gap between the spontaneous
time of technological change and the socially desirable one. Under network
externalities and incomplete information about ﬁrms’ switching costs, auc-
tioning investment grants appears to be a cost-eﬀective way of accelerating
pollution abatement, in that it allows targeting grants instead of subsidizing
the entire industry indiscriminately
JEL: Q28; O38.
Keywords: Environmental innovation, Investment irreversibil-
ity, Network externalities, Investment grants, Second-price auc-
tion.
21 Introduction
Since pollution abatement generally requires investment expenditures, proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms do not spontaneously1 improve their environmental perfor-
mance2 unless costs are oﬀset by some expected private beneﬁts. Following
the literature on so-called voluntary approaches, these beneﬁts may come
from better use of inputs (e.g. energy or material savings, abatement of
waste disposal costs), sales increase (consumers may be willing to pay more
for environment-friendly products or for goods produced by a ﬁrm which has
acquired a green reputation) and/or regulatory gains (preemption of more
stringent mandatory regulation or regulatory capture) (Brau and Carraro,
1999; Carraro and Léveque, 1999).
The performance of self-regulation has been analysed across diﬀerent di-
mensions, including its impacts upon market competition and environmental
eﬀectiveness. As far as the latter is concerned, Carraro and Léveque (1999)
cite two frequent sources of concern about the actual contribution of volun-
1By spontaneous pollution control ("self-regulation") we mean control eﬀorts which are
neither imposed by explicit directives ("command-and-control regulations) nor are driven
by "marked-based" regulations that encourage ﬁrms to undertake pollution abatement
(e.g. pollution charges or tradable permits).
2Firms may improve their environmental performance either by undertaking process
innovations or changes in product design which involve pollution abatement during the
product life cycle.
3tary approaches to environmental quality improvements. One is that ﬁrms
may not respect their commitments. The second cause concerns the low
ambition of pollution abatement targets.
A third potential cause of ineﬀectiveness, addressed in this paper, relates
to the timing of environmental innovation. Although ﬁrms have discovered
potentially proﬁtable green investment opportunities, voluntary process in-
novations or changes in product design may occur too slowly, i.e. they may
not prevent undesirable levels of pollutant accumulation and environmental
damage.
Why would ﬁr m s ,w h i c hh a v ed i s c o v e r e dag r e e ni n v e s t m e n to p p o r t u n i t y
whose costs are counter-balanced by expected private gains, postpone envi-
ronmental innovation? The real options approach to investment decisions
provides a possible answer. For instance, this approach teaches that when
an agent does not face a now-or-never investment decision, an option value
of waiting emerges before undertaking a project involving sunk costs and
uncertain payoﬀs( irreversibility eﬀect). In other words, the agent may ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to delay the investment, despite the project exhibiting a positive
net present value.3
3Obviously, not all green investment decisions meet the conditions required in order
to apply the conclusions of the real options approach: for example, these conclusions do
4This standard result stems from the analysis of investment decisions for
a single agent in isolation, i.e. without regarding to the potential impact of
other ﬁrms’ investment strategies. For instance, recent developments of the
real options approach show that when these decisions take place in a compet-
itive environment, strategic interactions between ﬁrms may either decrease
or further increase the option value of waiting (Lambrecht and Parraudin,
2003; Grenadier, 2002; Mason and Weeds, 2001; Moretto, 2000).
The value of waiting may signiﬁcantly decrease if the investment payoﬀs
depend on the number of ﬁrms which have already improved their environ-
mental performance and there is an advantage in being ﬁrst. For exam-
ple, preemption can hasten pollution abatement when ﬁrms interpret self-
regulation as a product diﬀerentiation strategy aimed at diﬀerentiating their
product or process from those of other ﬁr m si nt h ei n d u s t r yi no r d e rt oi n -
crease their market share. In other words, the risk of foregone competitive
advantages may counter-balance the beneﬁts of waiting for additional infor-
mation about consumers’ response to the supply of green products.
However, instead of hastening environmental innovation, strategic inter-
actions may further increase the option value of waiting. This may occur
not apply when ﬁrms are able to recover investment expenditures should the payoﬀs( e . g .
consumers’ willingness to pay for green products) turn out to be worse than anticipated.
5when there is an expectation of declining switching costs, due to the diﬀu-
sion of green technologies, whilst the investment payoﬀs are not negatively
correlated (e.g. when market demand shifts upward when green products
a r es o l di nt h em a r k e t )o ra r ei n d e p e n d e n to ft h en u m b e ro fﬁrms which
have improved their environmental performances (e.g. when the investment
payoﬀs are expected to come from input savings or from avoidance of future
costs of forthcoming public regulations that ﬁrms cannot inﬂuence).
Both strategic interactions typically involve an ineﬃcient time pattern
of private investment decisions. However, if we adopt a narrow view and
focus on the environmental eﬀectiveness of self-regulation, the most critical
scenario is the one where, because of second-mover advantages, strategic
interactions exacerbate, rather than mitigate, the irreversibility eﬀect. In
particular, the expectation of declining investment costs may involve a war
of attrition whose eﬀect is to further delay pollution abatement.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we illustrate the impacts
of the war of attrition upon the option value of waiting and, consequently,
upon the private time of pollution abatement. Secondly, assuming that a
public authority has somehow arbitrarily pre-identiﬁed the desirable time for
technological change, we focus on the design of policy instruments - namely,
6investment grants - aimed at bridging the gap between the spontaneous time
of environmental innovation and the "socially" desirable one.
We do this by extending and generalizing the continuous-time model of
environmental policy adoption of Dosi and Moretto (1997; 1998). In mar-
kets with no large investors, Dosi and Moretto (1997) stressed that, in order
to enhance the eﬀectiveness of environmental policies, regulators should ac-
c o u n tf o rt h eo p t i o nv a l u eﬁrms face when deciding the time of an investment
involving sunk costs and uncertain returns. In particular, the optimal sub-
sidy must be selected to compensate the ﬁrm’s value of waiting. However,
in the case of large investors the problem faced by policy-makers becomes
more complicated because they have to consider the impact of other ﬁrms’
investment strategies. In this respect, Dosi and Moretto (1998) analysed the
impacts of declining switching costs in a duopoly model and argued that reg-
ulators may accelerate environmental innovation by auctioning investment
grants.
Here we generalize the above papers by providing a general solution ap-
proach for deriving the ﬁrms’ equilibrium investment strategies in a second-
mover-advantages framework. We consider both the irreversibility eﬀect and
network externalities on the investment costs in a N+1agents-model and we
7model the competition for the investment grant as a Vickrey auction where
ﬁrms simultaneously submit their bids, the subsidy is granted to the most
eﬃcient ﬁrm and it is priced according to the second-best bidder. Moreover,
in order to illustrate the properties of the model and get some quantitative
idea of the eﬀect of the second-mover-advantage on the ﬁrms’ adoption deci-
sion, we calibrate the model following as far as possible the indications given
in the real option literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a model in
which N+1ﬁrms, belonging to the same industry, face the same opportunity
of undertaking an irreversible green investment involving stochastic payoﬀs;
each agent’s timing of technological change is inﬂuenced by the investment
decision of the other, because switching costs are negatively correlated to the
number of ﬁrms which have adopted the green technology. Section 3 deals
with the war of attrition game that emerges; we show that if switching costs
are private knowledge, the free-riding attitude induced by the expectation
of network beneﬁts may signiﬁcantly increase the option value of waiting
and, consequently, the investment delay. Section 4 focuses on the design of
investment grants aimed at bridging the gap between the expected private
time of innovation and the socially desirable time; we examine the properties
8of a second-price auction, in which agents bid for the right to obtain public
funds for use in ﬁnancing the technological change. Section 5 concludes, and
the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
2T h e m o d e l
Consider a situation where N+1(N>0)r i s kn e u t r a lﬁrms, belonging to the
same industry, can abandon, at any time, their present (polluting)p r o d u c t i o n
process, in order to adopt a new (green)o n e ,b ya ﬀording a sunk switching
cost Cn,n=1 ,2.....N +1 .
The instantaneous green investment payoﬀ at time t, xt, is stochastic and
evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion:
dxt = αxtdt + σxtdzt with α,σ > 0 and x0 = x. (1)
where dzt is the increment of a standard Wiener process, satisfying the con-
ditions that E(dzt)=0and E(dz2
t)=dt; both the drift parameter α and the
volatility parameter (σ) are constant over time. Therefore E(dxt)=αxtdt
and E(dx2
t)=( σxt)2dt, i.e. starting from the initial value x0, the random
position of the instantaneous payoﬀ xt at time t>0 has lognormal distrib-
9ution with mean x0eαt and variance x2
0(eσ2t − 1) which increases as we look
further and further into the future. The process has no memory, i.e. i) at
any point in time t,the observed xt is the best predictor of future proﬁts, ii)
xt may next move upwards or downwards with equal probability.
Whilst the investment payoﬀ is independent of the number of green ﬁrms,
we assume that agents’ switching cost, Cn, depends on the number of ﬁrms
q that have adopted the green technology:4
Cn(θ,q)=θnk(q),n =1 ,2...N +1 and q =1 ,2...N +1
where k(q) stands for the pure capital cost which is common knowledge,
and θn ∈ [0 ≤ θ,¯ θ ≤∞ ] is a private valuation parameter reﬂecting agent
n’s perception of foregone alternative investment opportunities in the future.
4As anticipated, the aim of this paper is to focus on situations where strategic interac-
tions exacerbate the impacts of investment irreversibility and uncertainty. However, the
model could be easily expanded to explore the impacts of preemption upon environmental
innovation time. For instance, if the instantaneous investment payoﬀs decline with the
number of green ﬁrms, a ﬁrst-mover advantage will emerge whose eﬀect is to reduce the
second-mover advantage resulting from the expectation of declining investment costs. See
for example Murto and Keppo (2002), Grenadier (2002) and Lambrecht and Perraudin







k for q =1
k − ∆k for q 6=1
and 0 < ∆k<k
Since 0 < ∆k<kt h e r ei sa nt h ea d v a n t a g ei nc o o r d i n a t i n go rjoining a
network: the higher the agent’s investment opportunity cost, θn,t h eg r e a t e r
its share value of the network beneﬁt.6
According to the classical real-option based models (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994) the ﬁrms’ optimal investment rule is that the new technology’s beneﬁts
must outweigh its costs, where the latter consist of the individual strike price
Cn plus the value of the option exercised by undertaking the investment. As,
at any time t, all information about the future evolution of x is summarized
in the current value xt, the optimal decision rule relies on a realization of x
that is necessary and suﬃcient to stop waiting and undertake the project. In
5For the sake of simplicity, we consider a quite extreme form of war of attrition in
that all the ﬁrm but the ﬁrst gain the same network beneﬁt. Although this may be fairly
realistic for investment costs reduction that are expected to come from input savings, our
model may be generalized to situations in which the network beneﬁt increase as long as
more ﬁrms adopt the new technology.
6For diﬀerent reasons we exclude both ∆k =0and ∆k = k. If ∆k =0there would be
no strategic interaction and each ﬁrms’ problem could be solved separately. On the other
hand, if ∆k = k the model reduces to a game of private provison of a pure public goood
( e x c e p tf o rt h ef a c tt h a ti ft w oo rm o r eﬁrms provide the good at the same time, their
provisions costs would fall to zero), with stochastic ﬂow beneﬁts (see Bliss and Nalebuﬀ,
1984).
11other words, the ﬁrms will invest if the current ﬂow of income xt has crossed
from below an upper single trigger value ¯ xn, n 1,2,...N +1 .












| x0 = x
¾
∀n, (2)
where r>αis the constant risk-free rate of interest7,a n dE0(.) is the
operator expectation conditional on the information available at time t =0 .
Furthermore, Tn =i n f ( t>0 | xt =¯ x∗
n), is the future random starting time
at which ﬁrm n ﬁnds it optimal to go ﬁrst and ¯ x∗
n is the income threshold
that triggers it.
3T h e w a r o f a t t r i t i o n
Firms’ time of investment is aﬀected by two sources of inertia. On the one
hand, because of sunk costs, environmental innovation is slowed by the un-
7Alternatively we can use a discount rate that includes an appropriate adjustment for
risk and take the expectation with respect to a distribution for x that is adjusted for risk
neutrality (see Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
12certainty about the investment payoﬀs( irreversibility eﬀect). On the other
hand, innovation is decelerated by the second-mover advantage resulting from
declining switching costs. In particular, as far as the second source is con-
cerned, the uncertainty about the other ﬁrms’ opportunity cost makes it ad-
visable to wait in order to see how things go for the others before switching
(war of attrition eﬀect). If this does not happen and the rivals are reluctant
to adopt the green technology, the agent may eventually decide to switch
ﬁrst.
At each time t ﬁrms observe the realization of the state variable xt, and,
depending on their private valuation parameter θ, decide whether to invest.
Secondly, there is a Bayesian learning process where agents learn by observing
the rivals’ behaviour. A Nash equilibrium will then be the solution of a pair of
linked stopping time problems, where each agent solves its switching problem
by taking account of the rivals’ possible actions and learning about the rivals’
valuation parameters from the fact that they have not switched up to that
moment.
Speciﬁcally, each agent n will optimally select an upper trigger level ¯ x∗
n,
n =1 ,2....N +1 . Thus, if at time tx t ≥ ¯ x∗
n and the rivals have not yet
switched, the agent n will unilaterally innovate. Otherwise, if any one of its
13rivals has already switched at xt < ¯ x∗
n,a g e n tn learns that it can adopt the
green technology by paying k − ∆k and with him, all the others.
Note, however, that the certainty of being second does not imply switch-
ing immediately. As the switching cost depends on θ,a n dx is assumed to
be independent of the number of green ﬁrms, a lower trigger level ¯ x∗∗
n < ¯ x∗
n
always exists, below which the only dominant strategy is to keep the option
to invest alive, and wait longer before exercising it. Only when xt crosses ¯ x∗∗
n
do the agents consider the possibility of switching second.
As long as ¯ x∗∗
n <x t < ¯ x∗
n each ﬁrm waits for the others to change
technology ﬁrst. During this period of excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner,
1985) each ﬁrm experiences both costs (foregone expected cash ﬂows) and
beneﬁts of delaying: the latter come from the hope of getting additional
information about the investment payoﬀs and by second-mover advantages.




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(a) if 0 <x<¯ x∗∗
n
(b) if ¯ x∗∗
n ≤ x<¯ x∗
n




(a) do not switch, regardless of the rivals’ behaviour;
(b) switch only if a rival has already switched, i.e. jumping on the band-
wagon;
(c) unilaterally switch, i.e. initiating the bandwagon.
3.1 The optimal private trigger values
Consider the optimal trigger value ¯ x∗
n for agent n ( b ys y m m e t r yt h es a m e
results hold for all N +1a g e n t sa sw e l l ) . W ea s s u m et h a tﬁrm n has ra-
tional conjectures about the distribution of the other ﬁrms’ triggers. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that each ﬁrm’s investment trigger is continuously
distributed and drawn independently from a common distribution function
F(¯ x∗
n) which is strictly increasing on the interval [¯ xl,∞) and has a continuous
diﬀerentiable density f(¯ x∗
n).
As long as the N +1ﬁrms are independent, what matters for the ﬁrm n
is the event min[¯ x∗
















15which is the cumulative distribution (with density f(N)(¯ x∗
n)) of the minimum
of the N rivals’ triggers (i.e. the probability that all the other N ﬁrms have
lower triggers than n) on the same support [¯ xl,∞).
Let’s now derive the optimal investment rule for ﬁrm n, taking account
of the other ﬁrms’ behaviour as exogenously given. Firm n’s option value at
time zero to adopt the green technology at time Tn if the other ﬁrms are still













−rtdt − θn(k − ∆k)
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In other words, ﬁrm n’s option value of investing is given by the sum
of the option value to go as second at cost θn(k − ∆k) when a ﬁrm has






plus the option value of not investing until time Tn and then going ﬁrst.
16Tn =i n f ( t>0 | xt =¯ x∗
n) is then the switching time at which agent n
decides unilaterally to adopt the green technology (strategy c).
Furthermore, as xt moves randomly over time, the ﬁrm n will update its
conjecture. In particular, as time goes by and xt hits new upper levels without
the rivals switching, agent n learns that the rivals’ triggers lie in a smaller,
higher interval. A suﬃcient statistic that captures this information is given
by ut =s u p 0<s<t(xt) which denotes the maximum level of payoﬀ up to time
t without one of the ﬁrms having adopted the green technology. The ﬁrm n
then observes the realization of the state variable xt, updates its conjecture on




1−F(N)(ut) ,which is strictly
increasing on the interval [ut,∞), and instantaneously considers when it is































17The following proposition describes the properties of the stationary strat-
egy (3) resulting from maximization of (4).
Proposition 1 (i) If a threshold level ¯ x∗
n ∈ [¯ xl,∞) exists, such that 0 <
¯ x∗∗
n < ¯ x∗





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Strategy (a) if 0 <x<¯ x∗∗
n
Strategy (b) if ¯ x∗∗
n ≤ x<¯ x∗
n
Strategy (c) if x ≥ ¯ x∗
n
∀n


























n) is the hazard rate and β>1 is the positive root of the
quadratic equation Φ(β) ≡ 1
2σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − r =0 .
(ii) The optimal triggers are monotonically increasing in θn.
Proof. See Appendix.
18According to (4) and (6), although the value of the green investment
depends on both the current value of xt a n do nt h es t a t i s t i cut, the threshold
that triggers the technological change does not because the the hazard rate
Nh(¯ x∗
n) is independent of both xt and ut (see Appendix).
Since the hazard rate is deﬁned as the likelihood of an event occurring in
the next instant, given that the event has not occurred up to that instant,
in (6) it measures the likelihood of the ﬁrm n investing at ¯ x∗
n. The hazard
rate is zero when there is no probability of one ﬁrm going ﬁrst and goes to
inﬁnity when ut and/or N goes to inﬁnity.
Following Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), let’s consider what happens
as the incomplete information case reduces to one with complete information.
If θn is common knowledge and the degree of asymmetry in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
parameters is low (i.e. the interval [θ,¯ θ] is small), ﬁrms have no interest
in going unilaterally. They will be better-oﬀ coordinating and choosing to
invest at the time when the ﬁrm with the highest cost parameter θn switches.
The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is characterized as a war of
attrition where the ﬁrms try to invest as late as possible and, thereby, at the
optimal trigger of the less eﬃcient ﬁrm. That is, there is a common trigger
19value:
¯ x







(r − α)(k − ∆k)s u p
n∈[1,N+1]
(θn)
above which ﬁrms switch to the green technology.8 Consequently, unlike in
Farrell and Saloner (1985), there might be excess inertia even under complete
information. The ﬁrms with lower cost parameters will ﬁnd it optimal to wait
until technological change becomes proﬁtable for some of their rivals and then
coordinate adoption. The loss due to waiting is more than compensated by
the reduction in investment cost deriving from coordination.9
For the latter limit case, suppose that an upper trigger ¯ xu exists so that
¯ x∗
n ∈ [¯ xl, ¯ xu]. As ut → ¯ xu and no ﬁrms have adopted yet, the ﬁrm n knows that
at least one of its rivals will act almost certainly in the next few instants,
which causes the hazard rate to explode to inﬁnity. The trigger value for
ﬁrmn should therefore also explode to inﬁnity which contradicts the fact of
having an upper bound ¯ xu < ∞.
Finally, a third interesting and related limiting case occurs when the
8If the degree of asymmetry is high there exist an equilibrium in which always one ﬁrm
invest before the others (Sparla, 2000).
9In the symmetric case θn = θ for all n, the social optimum is always obtained. A unique
threshold ¯ x∗∗ exists beyond which all the ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to move simultaneously (see
Moretto, 2000).
20number of competing ﬁr m sg o e st oi n ﬁnity. Since limN→∞ Nh(¯ x∗
n)=∞, also
the trigger ¯ x∗
n converges to inﬁn i t y .T h i si sas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dc o n s e q u e n c eo f
the war of attrition; as N increases each ﬁrm knows almost certainly that at
least one of its rivals will go ﬁrst. Each ﬁr mt a k e st h i so p p o r t u n i t y ,d e l a y i n g
the investment indeﬁnitely.
The following corollary illustrates the eﬀe c to ft h ew a ro fa t t r i t i o no nt h e
strategic option trigger:
Corollary 1 The strategy (c)’s optimal trigger is situated between inﬁnite




n ≤ ¯ x
+







The upper bound is reached when h(¯ x∗
n) →∞or N →∞ , while when
h(¯ x∗
n) → 0 the optimal trigger converges to ¯ x∗∗ =s u p n∈[1,N+1](¯ x∗∗
n ).
In short, whilst ¯ x+
n reﬂects the irreversibility eﬀect, the second term on
the r.h.s. of (6) reﬂects the war of attrition eﬀect which exacerbates the
impacts of investment irreversibility and uncertainty about private beneﬁts,
21i.e. increases the optimal trigger value and the investment delay.
Furthermore, proposition 1 shows that the higher θn the greater the in-
stantaneous investment payoﬀ at which it becomes proﬁtable to invest: the
optimal trigger ¯ x∗
n(θn) is an increasing mapping function of θn, in the support
[¯ xl(θ), ¯ xu(¯ θ)=∞).10 Therefore, even without making use of a discrete-time
model, we can also have sequential investments depending on the wedge in
agents’ valuation parameter θn. Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm n is the leader, we
get the following result.
Corollary 2 Sequential investment (‘diﬀu s i o n ’)e x i s t si f ¯ x∗∗
j (θj) > ¯ x∗
n(θn),
for some j 6= n.
3.2 Numerical results
To illustrate the properties of the above model and get some quantitative
ideas of the impact exercised by the war of attrition on the competitive adop-
tion of the new technology, in this section we provide some numerical solu-
tions of (5) and (6). The choice of parameters was made in the interest of sim-
10Using a model of preemption Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) show that asymmetric
information on costs results in the optimal trigger value ¯ x∗
n being a unique continuous
increasing mapping function of θn, i.e. ¯ x∗
n =¯ x∗





22plicity, respecting as far as possible some indications found in other studies
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Mauer and Ott, 1995; Lambrecht and Perraudin,
2003). The base parameters take the values: r =0 .05,α =0 .03,σ=0 .2,
N =4 ,k=1 0and ∆k =5 , 2.5. The choice of α is made to guarantee
the ﬁrms’ average waiting time positive. Figures 1 and 2 show numerical
solutions for ¯ x∗∗
n (θn) and ¯ x∗
n(θn) within the interval θn ∈ [0,2], when F(¯ x∗
n)






, with γ =1and ¯ xl =0 .094.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
The triggers shown include: (i) the strategic trigger ¯ x∗
n; the non-strategic
trigger ¯ x+
n; and the second-mover trigger ¯ x∗∗
n , for cost reduction of 50% and
25% respectively. In both cases the solution starts at the origin and increases
monotonically for all the interval [0,2]. The second-mover trigger is always far
below the optimal trigger under the war of attrition. In addition, the ratio
23between the strategic trigger and the non-strategic trigger, ¯ x∗
n/¯ x+
n, equals
2.48 for ∆k =5and 1.74 for ∆k =2 .5 respectively. Thus current investment
payoﬀsh a v et or i s em o r et h a nd o u b l et h el e v e lt h a te n s u r e sap o s i t i v en e t
beneﬁtf o ras i n g l eﬁrm in isolation before the war of attrition ceases to
be worth playing by the ﬁrms (war of attrition eﬀect). If, to this eﬀect,
we add the irreversible eﬀect measured by the multiplier
β
β−1 =3 .85 (i.e.
β =1 .35), we get a total eﬀect of 5 to 6 t i m e st h ep o i n ti nw h i c ht h et o t a l
expected discounted investment payoﬀs equals the cost of investment, i.e. the
Marshallian trigger ¯ xM
n ≡ (r − α)θnk Therefore, even if the cost of capital
is as low as 5% per year, the value of waiting with network externalities can
quite easily lead to adjusted hurdle rates of 20 to 30 per cent.
4 Auctioning investment grants
Let’s now consider an agency which, on the grounds of available information
on ﬁrms’ pollutant emissions, accumulation processes and consequent social
damage, has identiﬁed ˆ T as the date by which all ﬁrms should abandon
the polluting technology and adopt the green one. Moreover, let’s assume
that the agency is unable or unwilling to adopt mandatory regulations and,
24if necessary, intends to accelerate environmental innovation by subsidizing
green investment expenditures. Subsidies will be granted if, and only if,
the agency believes that ﬁrms face a value of waiting, before undertaking the
green investment, greater than the one faced by society as a whole. However,
since the private switching time T is a stochastic variable, the agency has
to set a policy-rule referring to T’s probability distribution. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume the following simple rule:11
E(T)=ˆ T (7)
By (1) and the deﬁnition of T, (7) may be reformulated in terms of the
instantaneous investment payoﬀ, x, at which the technological change should
take place in order to satisfy the agency’s environmental objective. We denote
with ˆ x the social trigger value such that E[inf(t>0 | xt =ˆ x)] = ˆ T. 12
11Depending on diﬀerent assumptions about the agency’s risk aversion, the policy-rule
can be made more stringent by giving diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent moments of the private
switching time distribution.
12As the instantaneous payoﬀs are driven by (1), the ﬁrst passage time T from x to ˆ x is
a stochastic variable with ﬁrst moment E(T)=m−1 ln( ˆ x
x),w i t hm ≡ (α − 1
2σ2) so that
ˆ x = xeπ ˆ T (Cox and Miller, 1965, p. 221-222).
25To solve the optimization problem the environmental agency has to ﬁnd
an optimal compensation function. In order to optimize this compensation
function for all possible functions we apply the revelation principle which
reduces the possible set of grant-aided schemes to those where lying is not
proﬁtable. We organize the model as an auction of the Vickrey-type where
each ﬁrm simultaneously reports their respective optimal private triggers,
without seeing each other’s bid, and the subsidy is given to the ﬁrm that
r e p o r t st h el o w e s to n e( L a ﬀont and Tirole 1993 pp.314-320).
Before describing the grant-aided scheme, it is worth underlying two im-
portant features of our model. First, since the evolutionary pattern of x is a
Markov process (Harrison, 1985, pp. 80-81), the agency’s announcement of
ˆ T (or, equivalently, ˆ x)d o e s n o t a ﬀect the ﬁrms’ waiting game played prior
to ˆ T.Secondly, while the second-mover advantage, resulting from ∆k,s l o w s
down the spontaneous technological change, the existence of network bene-
ﬁts provides the agency with the opportunity to adopt a targeted policy. For
instance, by subsidizing the ﬁrm with the lower trigger ¯ x∗
n (the leader ﬁrm),
i.e. by anticipating initiation of the bandwagon, the agency may accelerate
the technological change throughout the entire industry.
26In particular, we will show that the subsidy received by the leader is
formed by the sum of a ﬁxed payment function - deﬁned according to the
diﬀerence between the announced trigger ˜ x∗
n and the social trigger ˆ x-p l u sa
linear sharing of overruns which depends on the announced trigger value. If
this subsidy is incentive-compatible it will be suﬃcient to induce the leader
to announce the true trigger ˜ x∗
n =¯ x∗
n, and to adopt the green technology
when x, randomly ﬂuctuating, hits the social trigger ˆ x. Although granting
a subsidy only to the leader ﬁrm may not be enough to achieve the policy
objective, by creaming the industry the proposed grant-aided scheme allows
the agency to induce the followers to jump on the bandwagon without paying
informational rents.13
The rationale behind the proposed grant-aided scheme can be summarised
as follows. Since the war of attrition which will emerge within the industry
can be interpreted as a sequence of (all-pay) second-price auctions14,g r a n t i n g
13By the revelation principle instead of having the ﬁrms submit their bid as a function
of ¯ x∗
n and then applying the rules of the auction mechanism to choose who receives the
subsidy, we could directly ask the ﬁrms to report their values ¯ x∗
n and then make sure that
t h eo u t c o m ei st h es a m ea si ft h e yh a ds u b m i t t e db i d s .
14Referring to the literature of auctions, what has just been described as a war of
attrition can be interpreted as a sequence of all-pay second-price auctions (Hirshleifer
and Riley, 1992, ch.10). For instance, at each time t, it is as if agents bid the value of
their opportunity to invest (4), Vn(xt;¯ x∗
n), and compare the relative merit of dropping out
immediately (investing ﬁrst) or staying in (delaying the decision) and bidding a further
amount. Agents bid by deciding upon a maximum (stochastic) number of periods over
which to compete which is determined by their optimal trigger levels ¯ x∗
n. Thus, as long as
27a subsidy to the leader ﬁr mi m p l i e st h a tt h ea g e n tw i t ht h el o w e s ti n v e s t m e n t
opportunity cost, whilst losing the war of attrition, will be the winning bid-
der in the public auction.15 By contrast, the followers will gain the network
beneﬁt, but will not receive public subsidies, unless their investment oppor-
tunity costs are so high that a public grant is still required in order to avoid
an undesirable time lag between the leader’s and the followers’ innovation
time.
4.1 The agency’s optimization problem
Let’s assume that the environmental agency acts as a utilitarian regulator
interested in accelerating environmental innovation.
Since ¯ x∗
n is private information, in order to exploit the potential regula-
tory beneﬁts resulting from network externalities, the agency has to iden-
tify an appropriate incentive mechanism such that the (unknown) leader
ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to abandon the polluting technology the ﬁrst
ﬁrms can perfectly observe the rival’s actions and immediately respond to them, if after
Tn =i n f ( t>0 | xt =¯ x∗
n) periods ﬁrms j 6= n ﬁnd that n has abandoned the polluting













− θj(k − ∆k), ∀j 6= n (8)
provided that θnk ≥ θj(k − ∆k). .
15See also Bulow and Klemperer (1999)
28time x,r a n d o m l yﬂuctuating, hits the social trigger ˆ x. Therefore, deﬁning
yn(¯ x∗
n;¯ x∗
−n) as the probability that ﬁrm n is selected to receive the subsidy,
with ¯ x∗








yn =1 , the optimal targeted
grant-aided scheme, under incomplete information, should emerge maximiz-
























where B is the estimated social beneﬁt brought about by accelerating en-
vironmental innovation (i.e. by lowering ﬁrms’ optimal trigger value at
ˆ x), sn(¯ x∗
n;¯ x∗
−n) is the subsidy in annuity terms, λ ≥ 0 is the shadow cost
of public funds and πn(¯ x∗















n − ˆ x)
ª
, for ˆ x ≤ ¯ x
∗
n.
Furthermore, without loss of genera l i t y ,w em a ya s s u m et h a tt h ea g e n c y
knows the ﬁrms’ conjectural distribution. Therefore, conditional on the in-
formation available at the time when the grant-aided scheme is announced,
29the ﬁrms’ optimal trigger levels are drawn independently from the same con-
tinuous distribution F(¯ x∗
n;ut), with density f(¯ x∗
n;ut) and ut =ˆ x.





























subject to all the N +1ﬁrms’ optimization problem. The ﬁrm’s n optimiza-






n;ˆ x) ≥ 0 ∀n
Continuing with agent n as representative, the following proposition in-
dicates the results of the auction.



















































which shows that the subsidy is strictly monotone decreasing in ¯ x∗
n,a n d
conﬁrms the eﬃciency of the auction: the subsidy is given to the most eﬃcient
ﬁrm.
4.2 Implementation
While maximization of (9) determines expected transfers, i.e. the ﬁrms’ op-
timal reporting strategies on average given the rivals’ strategies through the
probability (1 − F(N)(¯ x∗
n;ˆ x)), we can construct a dominant strategy auction
of a Vickrey type that implements the same investment strategy as the one
found from optimizing the welfare function (9), and selects the most eﬃcient
31ﬁrm.16
Since, for the Vickrey auction, revelation of the true trigger value ¯ x∗
n is
a dominant strategy but the subsidy is priced according to the second bid
(second-price auction), in our N +1agents case this implies implementing a




n;ˆ x)=( ¯ x
∗



















When agent n wins the auction, the subsidy is equal to the individually
rational transfer (¯ x∗
n − ˆ x) plus the rent it gets when the conjectural distrib-





.S i n c e
E¯ xj {˜ si(¯ x∗
i;ˆ x)} = si(¯ x∗
i;ˆ x), the contract given by (10) costs the same in terms
of annuity subsidy as the optimal Bayesian auction (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993,
pp. 319-320).
Thus competition among the ﬁrms implies that the interval of possible






16A dominant strategy auction is an auction where each agent has a strategy that is






is the second-lowest bid reported at time ˆ T when the auction
is run.







ˆ x +(¯ x∗
























Recalling that xt has lognormal distribution with mean E0(xt)=x0eαt,
the ﬁrst term in the r.h.s. of (11) represents the expected net present value
of the payoﬀs starting at the given initial position x ˆ T =ˆ x+˜ sn(¯ x∗
n;ˆ x), whilst
the second term is the net present value of the project starting at the initial
position ˆ x without compensation.
Continuing with the numerical solutions of section 3.2, we are able to
evaluate the total subsidy (11). Let’s assume that the second-lowest bid-
ding ﬁrm has a private valuation parameter equal (normalized) to one, i.e.






1.34 for ∆k =2 .5 and 1.91 for ∆k =5respectively.
33If ˆ T =2 0years from now and the income starting state is x =1 , the
social trigger value equals ˆ x =1 .22. Then, provided that ¯ x∗
n > 1.22, the
winning ﬁrm’s total subsidy is equal to Sn =6with ∆k =2 .5 and 34.5 with
ac o s tr e d u c t i o n∆k =5respectively.17 Further, if ˆ T reduces to 10 years and
then ˆ x =1 .1, the total subsidy increases substantially from Sn =1 2with
∆k =2 .5 to 40.5 with ∆k =5respectively.
Although the above results should be viewed as illustrative in nature and
limited to giving an initial idea of the magnitude of the network eﬀect, they
show that the total subsidy to induce the most eﬃcient ﬁrm to adopt the
green technology earlier can be considerably higher than the investment cost.
This suggests guidelines for more realistic research.
So far, we have considered the case where the network beneﬁti ss u c h
that adoption of the green technology by the (subsidized) leader ﬁrm is suf-
ﬁcient to induce the other ﬁrms to switch immediately afterwards. However,
as shown in Corollary 2, we can have diﬀusion depending on the wedge in
ﬁrms’ opportunity cost θ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w h e nn goes ﬁrst, we get sequential
adoption if ¯ x∗∗
j (θj) > ¯ x∗
n(θn), at least for some j 6= n. In this case, granting
a subsidy to the leader ﬁrm is not enough to induce technological change
17The private average waiting time for θ =1varies from nearly 30 to 65 years.
34throughout the entire industry: in other words, a subsidy should also be
granted to other ﬁrms. However, under our assumptions, on the basis of
the announcement received from the leader ﬁrm, the subsidy received by the
followers does not involve payment of an informational rent and it will be
calculated referring to ¯ x∗∗
j .
5F i n a l r e m a r k s
Even when ﬁrms have discovered proﬁtable green investment opportunities,
various sources of inertia may involve a private time of environmental inno-
vation incompatible with avoidance of undesired levels of pollutant accumu-
lation and social damage. This may occur when investment irreversibility,
and the ability to postpone the decision, creates an option value of waiting
before undertaking a technological change involving uncertain payoﬀs.
Strategic interactions may either decrease or further increase this option
value. This occurs when the value of an investment depends on the number
of ﬁrms which have undertaken the technological change, so that each agent’s
investment time is inﬂuenced by the investment decisions of others. In this
paper we have examined what appears to be the most critical scenario from
35an environmental point of view, i.e. a situation where second-mover advan-
tages exacerbate the irreversibility eﬀect and increase the option value of
waiting. In particular, we have explored the impacts of second-mover advan-
tages arising from the expectation of declining investment costs due to the
diﬀusion of new green technologies.
Although the expectation of declining investment costs tends to further
decelerate voluntary irreversible green investments, the existence of network
beneﬁts provides the policy-maker with the opportunity of targeting invest-
ment grants to the ﬁrm(s) with lower switching costs. In fact, by accelerating
initiation of technological change, the regulator may induce the whole indus-
try to switch. However, this policy strategy requires knowledge of the private
switching costs. Otherwise, appropriate incentive mechanisms are required
to minimize agents’ informational rents.
To ﬁnd a cost-eﬀective grant-aided scheme, we have examined a second-
price sealed-bid private value auction where agents are required to announce
their optimal trigger values, and a subsidy is granted to the ﬁrm which an-
nounces the lowest one, i.e. to the agent with the lowest switching cost.
However the subsidy is priced according to the second-best bidder. Besides
taking into account pure capital expenditures and including informational
36rents, the subsidy under consideration must compensate the leader ﬁrm for
killing its option value of waiting. In other words, the ﬁrm must be compen-
sated for the loss of beneﬁts from delaying investment, i.e. for the value of
waiting for more information about the investment payoﬀsa n df o rt h el o s s
of network beneﬁts.
Granting a subsidy only to the leader ﬁrm may prove to be insuﬃcient
to induce the other agents to switch immediately afterwards. For instance,
simultaneous or sequential environmental innovation may emerge, depend-
ing on the wedge in ﬁrms’ switching cost. However, under the proposed
grant-aided scheme, the subsidy received by the followers does not involve
payment of an informational rent. In other words, auctioning investment
grants may prove to be a cost-eﬀective way of creaming the industry, and
accelerating environmental innovation, under incomplete information about
private switching costs.
37A Appendix
A.1 proof of proposition 1
The ﬁrst part of the proof consists in identifying the optimal choice of the
pure strategies’ trigger levels for all players as a function of the state variable
x and of the conjectural distribution F, and then looking for the stationary
Nash equilibrium strategies. Let’s begin with strategy (b). As investment
payoﬀs do not depend on the number of green ﬁrms, agent n does not need to
know his rivals’ valuation parameter θ to follow strategy (b). He will consider
switching only if xt ≥ ¯ x∗∗
n which is obtained by maximizing:
Vn(¯ x
∗∗







−rtdt − θn(k − ∆k)
¶
| x0 = x
¾
(12)
By using standard results (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck,
1994), it easy to write (12) as:
Vn(¯ x
∗∗











38where β>1 is the positive root of the quadratic equation Φ(β) ≡ 1
2σ2β(β −
1) + αβ − r =0 .
Finally, taking the derivative of the above expression with respect to ¯ x∗∗
n
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n is the point at which Vn(x;¯ x∗∗
n ) smoothpastes to the exercise line
x
r−α − θn(k − ∆k) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 183)
Let’s continue with strategy (c). If agent n decides to invest unilaterally,
taking account of the probability of being anticipated, the value at time t of
adopting the green technology is given by (4). As stated in the text, using
Bayes’ rule, the relationship between F(N)(¯ x∗
n) and F(N)(¯ x∗









where ut =s u p
0<s<t
(xt). (15)





n) as the current value of the hazard
39rate, it can be easily seen that it is independent of ut, that is:
f(N)(¯ x∗
n;ut)















































































The ﬁr s tt e r ma c c o u n t sf o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hut < ¯ x∗∗
n . In this case, the
agent does not invest even if it knows that it will pay k − ∆k. The second
term is the usual option value of a single ﬁrm, and ﬁnally the third term is
the expected gain by ﬁghting before adopting. Firm n’s optimal trigger value










































β−1(r−α)θnk is the trigger value of going ﬁrst without strategic
behavior (or if ﬁrms do not expect a network beneﬁt, i.e. ∆k =0 ) .L o o k i n g
for a maximum of Vn(xt;¯ x∗
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41where the assumption that h(¯ x∗
n) is increasing in ¯ x∗
n assures the suﬃciency.18






























n is invariant to the current value of the state variable x, in general




θn as xt increases, and the bandwagon optimal rule deﬁned
in (3) and (20) is a contingent plan of how to play each time t for possible
realization of the state x, which summarizes the entire history of the game
up to that point. H o w e v e r ,a st h eh a z a r dr a t e( 1 6 )i si n d e p e n d e n to fut,t h e
trigger value also becomes independent of the information variable ut. This
makes the optimal operating rule an stationary.
Finally, by (17) and (20) we are able to write the value of the option to
18This assumption is satisﬁed by standard distributions as uniform, negative exponen-
tial, Weibull and Pareto.
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That is, the stationary trigger ¯ x∗
n is the point at which the envelope function
Vn(ut;ut) smoothpastes to the exercise line xt
r−α − θnk (Moretto, 2000; Lam-
brecht and Perraudin, 2003). This concludes the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
















n − (¯ x+








Positivity of the above expression is guaranteed by the second order condition
for a maximum (19).
43A.2 Proof of proposition 2
We look for an incentive-compatible mechanism [sn(.),y n(.)],n=1 ,2...N +
1 that induces a truth-telling Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Deﬁning with
sn(˜ x∗
n;˜ x∗
−n) the ﬁrm n’s subsidy per unit of time, required to induce adoption
of the green technology at ˆ x, as a function of the announced trigger levels
˜ x∗
n and the rivals’ announcement ˜ x∗
−n =( ˜ x1, ˜ x2,..˜ xn−1,.,˜ xn+1,..˜ xN+1),i t s
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W er e f e rt o( 2 2 )a st h eﬁrm n’s proﬁt function, and yn(˜ x∗
n;˜ x∗
−n) is the prob-






A necessary condition for truth-telling is that the derivatives of ﬁrms’
proﬁt with respect to the agent n’s announcement ˜ x∗
n, and evaluated at the


















n − ˆ x)
¾
=0 , ∀n (23)
44Then, letting πn(¯ x∗
n;ˆ x) be ﬁrm n’s proﬁt function when telling the truth, by














< 0, ∀n (24)
That is, at the optimum the proﬁt function is nonincreasing in ¯ x∗
n. It follows
that the ﬁrm n’s individual rationality (participation constraint) is satisﬁed





















and the suﬃcient condition for truth-telling requires (Fudenberg and Tirole








≤ 0, ∀n. (26)
From (9) and the above arguments, the environmental agency’s ex ante ob-

























Since the agency’s objective function is decreasing in πn, and from (24) the
proﬁt function is decreasing in ¯ x∗
n, the individual participation constraint will
be tight at the highest trigger value ¯ xu. That is, assuming that, outside the
relationship with the regulator, each ﬁrm has opportunities normalized to
zero, we get: πn(¯ xu;ˆ x)=0 , for all n.



























































−n)=1 , for any ¯ x∗
n and ¯ x∗
−n.
As is usual in the regulatory theory under asymmetry of information,
we ﬁrst ignore the second-order condition to check later that it is indeed
satisﬁed at the optimum. As πn is considered the state variable in the above
maximization, we can substitute (25) in the agency’s objective function and
solve for the optimal yn. Integrating by parts (28) for given ¯ x∗
−n, the objective
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By the monotone hazard rate assumption the term R(¯ x∗
n, ˆ x;x,λ) is nonin-
creasing in ¯ x∗
n, therefore the optimal choice by the regulator would be:
yn(¯ x∗
n;¯ x∗
−n)=1 if ¯ x∗




−n)=0 if ¯ x∗









is nonincreasing almost everywhere which im-
plies that the second order condition (26) is always satisﬁed. Finally, from





























































i;ˆ x) ≡ (1 − F(¯ x∗
i;ˆ x))N, we get the subsidy
in the text. This concludes the proof.
48References
[1] Bliss, C. and B. Nalebuﬀ, (1984), "Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Danc-
ing: The Private Supply of a Public Good", Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 25, 1-12.
[2] Bolow, J. and P. Klemperer, (1999), "The Generalized War of Attrition".
American Economic Review 89, 175-189.
[3] Brau, R. and C.Carraro, (1999), "Voluntary Approaches, Market Struc-
ture and Competition", FEEM Note di Lavoro 53.99, Milan.
[4] Carraro, C. and F. Léveque, (1999), "Introduction: The Rationale and
P o t e n t i a lo fV o l u n t a r yA p p r o a c h e s " ,i nC .C a r r a r oa n dF .L e v e q u e ,e d s . ,
Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy, Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1-15.
[5] Cox, D.R. and H.D. Miller, (1965) T h eT h e o r yo fS t o c h a s t i cP r o c e s s
(Chapman and Hall, London).
[6] Cox, J.C. and S.A. Ross, (1976), “The Valuation of Options for Alter-
native Stochastic Process”, Econometrica, 53, 385-408.
49[7] Dixit, A. and R.S. Pindyck, (1994), Investment under Uncertainty
(Princeton University Press, Princeton)
[8] Dosi, C. and M. Moretto, (1997), "Pollution Accumulation and Firm In-
centives to Promote Irreversible Technological Change under Uncertain
Private Beneﬁts", Environmental & Resource Economics 10, 285-300.
[9] Dosi, C. and M. Moretto, (1998), "Auctioning Green Investment
Grants as a Means of Accelerating Environmental Innovation", Revue
d’Economie Industrielle, 83, 99-110.
[10] Farrell, J., and G., Saloner, (1985), "Standardization, Compatibility and
Innovation", RAND Journal of Economics, 16, 70-83.
[11] Grenadier, S.R., (2002), “Option Exercise Games: An Application to the
Equilibrium Investment Strategies of Firms”, The Review of Financial
Studies, 15, 691-721.
[12] Harrison, J.M., (1985), Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems,
New York (John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY).
50[13] Harrison J.M., and D. Kreps, (1979), “Martingales and Arbitrage in
Multiperiod Securities Markets”, Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 381-
408.
[14] Hirshleifer, J., and J.G. Riley, (1992), The Analytics of Uncertainty and
Information, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
[15] Laﬀont, J.J., and J. Tirole, (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procure-
ment and Regulation, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA)
[16] Lambrecht, B., and W., Perraudin, (2003), "Real Options and Preemp-
tion under Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Dynamics &
Control, 27, 619-643.
[17] Mason, R., and H. Weeds (2001), "Irreversibility Investment with Strate-
gic Interactions", CEPR Working Paper n.3013.
[18] Mauer, D.C., e S.H. Ott, (1995), “Investment under Uncertainty: The
Case of Replacement Investment Decisions”, Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 30, 4, pp.581-605.
[19] McDonald R., and D. Siegel (1986), "The Value of Waiting to Invest",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 707-727.
51[20] Moretto, M., (2000), "Irreversible Investment with Uncertainty and
Strategic Behavior", Economic Modelling, 17, 589-617.
[21] Murto, P. and J. Keppo (2002), "A Game Model of Irreversible In-
vestment under Uncertainty", International Game Theory Review,4 ,
127-140.
[22] Sparla, T., (2000), "Closure Options in Duopoly: The Case of Second-
Mover Advantages", University of Dortmund, Discussion Paper n.01-06.
52Figure 1. Network eﬀect ∆k =5
Figure 2. Network eﬀect ∆k =2 .5
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